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A mixed-integer non-linear programming model that minimises the total regulatory
costs of controlling nitrogen oxide is used to investigate how a newly proposed permit
trading scheme in Taiwan, which incorporates the features of banking and a non-
one-to-one trading ratio, may affect ﬁrms’ emission reduction strategies and permit
trading decisions. Compared to the previous regulation where only an air pollution
fee is used, the new regulation that requires a reduction in emissions by 10 per cent
from the emission level in the year 2000 for a 5 year period will increase the costs by




9.87 million. The design of banking and the
increasing returns to scale characteristic of pollution control among ﬁrms might lead
to an uneven reduction in emissions in each year. Setting a lower reservation rate for
banking would, however, help maintain a more stable environmental quality without









A tradable permit system has been widely used in many countries for pollution
control (e.g. the Acid Rain Trading Program in the U.S. and the Greenhouse
Gas Emission Trading Scheme in the European Union). Theoretically, the
system can reach a given environmental target in a cost-effective way under
certain assumptions such as full information and zero transaction costs
(Montgomery 1972). A series of empirical studies has also indicated that sub-
stantial cost savings could be achieved by implementing a tradable permit
system (e.g. Atkinson and Lewis 1974; Maloney and Yandle 1984; Krupnik
1986; Johnson and Pekelney 1996). Encouraged by the successful experience
of the U.S. Acid Rain Trading Program, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in Taiwan has planned to establish its ﬁrst permit trading program
together with the current air pollution fee regulation in the Kaohsiung and
Pingtung counties in Southern Taiwan, the major bases for heavy industries,




) emissions in the year 2005. By modelling a
framework which incorporates the features of the proposed mixed system
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of permit trading and air pollution fees, this study aims to analyse how the
regulation may affect ﬁrms’ emission reductions and permit trading behaviour.
In the past 30 years, various modiﬁcations have been made regarding per-
mit trading to meet the needs of control agencies. For example, the design of
banking or borrowing has changed ﬁrms’ behaviour in relation to emission
control (e.g. Cronshaw and Kruse 1996; Rubin 1996; Hagem and Westkog
1998; Leiby and Rubin 2001; Phaneuf and Requate 2002). However, to main-
tain air quality, a discount rate (banking ratio) or a limitation on use over a
given lifetime may be applied to the banking permit. In the permit trading




 control in the Eastern U.S., the control agency has set
up a ‘ﬂow control’ mechanism which restricts the aggregate level of banking
to limit the year-to-year variability in emissions. Under this system, if the total
amount of banked emissions by all sources exceeds 10 per cent of the total
allowable emissions for the year, a 2-for-1 discount will be applied to the use




. 2000). Similarly, in the Emission
Reduction Market System (ERMS) for Volatile Organic Material control
adopted in Chicago, the unused permits can only be banked for 1 year (Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency 1996).
In addition to banking and borrowing, some studies have focused on emission
trading that is not on a one-to-one basis but is governed through exchange or
trading ratios determined by spatial factors such as the timing of emissions
and the magnitude of wind ﬂows when the pollutant is non-uniformly mixed




. 2000). The ambient permit system
(APS) that takes into account the geographical difference in each pollution
source is a deﬁnite example of such a design. However, the APS cannot be easily
adopted for practical use due to the fact that ﬁrms need to hold enough
permits for each receptor. Since implementing a trading system with spatial
considerations is complicated, simpliﬁed versions such as a pollution-offset




. 1983; McGartland and Oates 1985) and an










(1983), an exchange rate that considers location effects among ﬁrms is set
endogenously and is also not easy to use in practical applications. To overcome




. (2000) have proposed another
exogenously determined exchange rate system based on the mean of the random
variable used for meteorological uncertainty. For some areas, such as the
Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties in this study where no appropriate probability
density function can be applied due to the highly unstable weather conditions,
however, the control agency in Taiwan has further simpliﬁed the trading ratio
system into one in which all transactions take place at the same exchange rate.
The rate is set higher than one to maintain air quality. Even if the hetero-
geneity of the ﬁrms’ location effect might be overlooked or even overemphasised,
what matters is that control agencies could gain ease of implementation. In
addition, actual transaction costs will be lower if ﬁrms have to participate
only in a single market with the same trading ratio as others. 
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Our review of the literature on location effects under permit trading
reveals no literature that emphasises the trading ratio issue mentioned above
and which also incorporates the possibility of banking, due to difﬁculties in
modelling. Nor do they offer an operational framework to analyse how the
discounted banked permits and the non-one-to-one trading ratio can be
designed. This study proposes a conceptual and operational framework by
integrating both the design of the banking system and the feature of a non-
one-to-one trading ratio.
 
2. KPERMS – background
 
The Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties are the main areas where the electricity
and gas, paper, fabric and metal, manufacturing, petroleum reﬁning and




 from these highly
polluting industries has led to serious health damage over the past 20 years.
In contrast to the command and control policy adopted in the early days,
an air pollution fee was introduced in 1995 to ensure that the air quality in
Taiwan could reach a level comparable to that of developed nations. This
unit air pollution fee is determined by geographical indicators such as wind,
temperature, the amount of rainfall and the adoption or use of certain
pre-approved technology. Based on an EPA report (2006), the average annual








 and has become
an important ﬁnancial source for many counties. Around the time the air




 emissions decreased by a signiﬁcant amount





 emission levels have started to increase and now are around
52 000 tons (Executive Yuan 2006). Thus, the EPA has proposed a new con-





 through a tradable permit system. The target of this newly proposed
regulation, referred to as the Kaohsiung–Pingtung Emission Reduction




 emissions by 10 per cent in
each year based on the year 2000 baseline emission levels. Thus, each ﬁrm
needs to reduce its emissions by at least 10 per cent in each year in accord-
ance with its baseline for the year 2000. When ﬁrms fail to sufﬁciently reduce
their emissions, they have to buy permits in the market to fulﬁl the reduction
requirements. If the newly proposed permit trading system can be imple-
mented successfully in this area, the same regulation will be applied to other
areas in Taiwan.
KPERMS is not a pure permit trading scheme. Instead, it is a mixed regu-
latory system. That is, even though ﬁrms are allowed to trade emission rights,
they still have to pay for the pollution they have emitted. However, the draft




All price-related information used in this study is measured in US dollars. 
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a mixed system can have a preferential air pollution fee rate for at most ﬁve
years. The purpose behind incorporating the current air pollution fee is to
maintain the revenue for government use, but not to act as a ‘trigger price’ as
suggested by Roberts and Spence (1976) and Pizer (2002) due to the uncer-
tainty of compliance costs among ﬁrms. Unlike those ‘emission allowance
systems’ such as the U.S. Acid Rain program and the ERMS, KPERMS is an
emission credit system in which ﬁrms can only apply for an emission reduc-




 emissions is higher than the





 emissions. However, the amount of excess emission reduction needs to
be adjusted ﬁrst through an exchange coefﬁcient which is currently set at 1.2
by the EPA as the amount of ERCs for which ﬁrms can apply. For example,




 emissions of a ﬁrm is 12 tons higher than
the 10 per cent target, then it can only apply for 10 units of ERCs after the
adjustment. The unused ERCs can be sold or banked for future use, but they
can only be kept for 5 years. In addition, each banked ERC needs to be
discounted by a reservation coefﬁcient prior to future use. For example, one




emissions this year under a 0.8 reservation coefﬁcient. The banked ERCs
need to be adjusted by the same rate each year. Thus, the longer the ERC has




 that it can offset. Currently, no
agreement has been reached regarding the value of the reservation rate in the
KPERMS draft. For the purposes of the simulation, this study assumes a
coefﬁcient of 0.8.
Based on the hearing held by the EPA in 2002 for implementing the
KPERMS in the Kaohsiung and Pingtung counties, most ﬁrms in this area
expressed reservations regarding the mixed system of pollution control. This
is not only because permit trading is a new concept for them, but also
because the new regulation will require them to further reduce their current
emission levels. Furthermore, they only recently experienced a regulatory
change from command and control to the air pollution fee in 1995. If the





 control policy would have been dramatically changed twice in the past
10 years. Thus, the implementation of the system has been postponed on several






In order to capture the special features of the KPERMS and determine an
efﬁcient technology adoption and trading pattern, a mixed-integer non-linear




Based on a telephone interview with a Mr Wu at the EPA, the program could be imple-
mented as early as late 2007. 
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reﬂects the perspective of a social planner in achieving the targeted emission
reduction levels in the most economical way. The objective of the model of
the social planner is to minimise the total regulatory costs of all ﬁrms which
consist of the emission control and the air pollution fees. Each ﬁrm can either




  emissions to comply with its emission reduction
requirement and sell excess permits, or else buy the required permits from
other participants in the market. The model assumes that all these decisions
are controlled by the social planner who has full information regarding the
individual producer’s cost structure. This means implicitly that all participants
cooperate both with each other and with the social planner in adopting the
socially optimal solution. Clearly, this is not a true representation of reality,
but the purpose here is to determine a socially optimal solution which provides
a benchmark against other alternatives.
When different exchange and reservation coefﬁcients are set to transfer
emission reductions and banked permits into real ERCs that can be actually
traded in the market, we need to distinguish whether or not ERCs in trading
markets are generated in the current year or from previous banking. To
accomplish this, we create two separate ‘imaginary’ markets referred to as
the ‘fresh’ and ‘banking’ markets for ERC transactions. The fresh market is
composed of ERCs generated from the current period, while the banking
market is designed only for ERC transactions from previous years. Firms can
participate in either market to meet the environmental standards.
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) is the total cost function of
NOx control by ﬁrm F using BACT; tF is the unit air pollution fee paid cur-
rently by ﬁrm F in year 2004; bF,Y is the amount of pollution generated by
ﬁrm F in year Y if no regulation is imposed and can be viewed as the ﬁrm’s
baseline emission level; k and r are the exchange and reservation coefﬁcients
set by the EPA; c is an exogenously assigned constant; DF,Y, SF,Y and BF,Y are
the amounts of ERCs bought, sold and banked, respectively, by ﬁrm F in
year Y;   and   are the required emission reduction levels set by ﬁrms
in the artiﬁcial fresh and banking market; MF,Y which is the sum of   and
 is the required reduction emission level set by the control agency for
ﬁrm F in year Y; hF,Y is the required reduction ratio set by the EPA; UF,Y and
VF,Y are the positive and negative deviation variables used to control ﬁrms’
ERC buying and selling behaviour; and ZF,Y is a binary variable. All variables
written in upper case represent endogenous variables, while those written in
lower case are exogenously assigned.
The objective function (1) represents the total regulatory cost of emission
control to ﬁrms. The ﬁrst term is the cost resulting from the emissions reduction,
while the second term represents the air pollution fee paid by each ﬁrm dur-
ing the planning process. Equations (2) and (3) regulate the annual emission
level for each ﬁrm in the fresh and banking markets. This means that, at the
end of each year, each ﬁrm must either reduce its emissions by an adequate
amount or have sufﬁcient ERCs on hand to offset the difference between the
required and actual NOx reduction levels in order to satisfy the EPA’s regulation.
The left-hand side of Equation (2) represents the supply side of ERCs in the
fresh market. The emission reduction credits come from the ﬁrms’ emission
reduction activities or from purchases made through market transactions.
These two sources determine the possible supply of ERCs. The right-hand
side of Equation (2) is the demand side for ERCs. For any ﬁrm, it includes





,,     = 0











Xb FY FY ,,    ≤
ZFY
f
































,Mixed system for nitrogen oxide control 481
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
emission reduction. If the total supply of ERCs is greater than or equal to the
total demand for ERCs, then the overall emission standard will be met. Since
the amount of the emission reduction needs to be adjusted ﬁrst through an
exchange coefﬁcient before becoming an ERC, the coefﬁcient k is used to
adjust the difference between the emission reduction level and the number of
ERCs.
Similar to Equation (2), Equation (3) is the emission constraint for ﬁrms in
the banking market. The left-hand side of constraint (3) is the sum of ERCs
bought, the banked ERCs from the previous trading season, and the banked
ERCs directly from the banking market itself. In addition, regardless of
whether the banked ERCs are from the previous year or the banking market
itself, they need to be adjusted by a reservation coefﬁcient r. A lower value of
r implies that less unused ERCs can be carried for future use. The right-hand
side of this constraint implies that those banked or bought ERCs in the
banking market can be sold or used to meet the required emission reduction
level set by a ﬁrm. Since ﬁrms are free to meet their emission standards in
each market, Equation (4) implies that the sum of these two endogenously
determined standards needs to satisfy the real government regulatory target.
In Equation (2), the amount of supplied and banked ERCs in the fresh
market will only be positive when XF,Y > hF,YbF,Y. However, when a ﬁrm has
no ERC for sale or banking, it may either not be engaging in any emissions
reduction (XF,Y = 0) or may only be reducing its emissions by less than the
required amount (XF,Y < hF,YbF,Y). Since the model allows ﬁrms to freely
choose the required reduction levels in each market, constraints (5)–(8) are
established to avoid the situation where ﬁrms choose a lower emission standard
in the fresh market and supply an amount of ERCs that is not in compliance
with the KPERMS rules during the problem-solving process. To accomplish
this, constraint (5) ﬁrst deﬁnes the gap between the ﬁrms’ actual emission reduc-
tions and the required reduction levels. When the difference XF,Y − hF,YbF,Y is
positive,   and   Conversely,   and   Con-
straints (6) and (7) then restrict the value of these deviation variables to be
determined by the product of a constant c and a binary variable  . When
the binary variable   equals 1, the positive deviation variable   must
be positive, and the negative deviation variable   must be 0. Therefore, the
left-hand side of constraint (5) must be positive. This implies that ﬁrms will
have ERCs for sale or banking. In other words, when   is 0,   is 0 and
 must be positive. This will lead to the left-hand side of constraint (5)
being negative, and will mean that ﬁrms’ actual emission reduction levels are
lower than the required levels and that no ERCs can be generated. Constraint (8)
then ensures that when a ﬁrm reduces its emission by more than the required
amount, it can have the right quantity of ERCs for sale and banking.
Equations (9) and (10) require that ﬁrms not act as both buyers and sellers
in the same trading market. The purpose in adding this constraint is that it
offers more information for solving this complicated MINLP model. How-
ever, these two constraints do not rule out the possibility that a ﬁrm may play
UFY
f
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different roles in each market. Equation (11) represents the equilibrium
constraint for the permit trading market. It requires that the total supply of
permits from both markets equal the total demand. Since our model contains
binary variables, the shadow price information may or may not be able to
represent the equilibrium permit price. The related price issue under a discrete
modelling structure will be further explored in the next section. Constraint
(12) implies that a ﬁrm cannot reduce its emissions below its baseline emission
level. Constraint (13) is for binary variable   The last constraint (14) requires
that the endogenous variables be non-negative.
4. Data
The data required in the social planner’s model, which includes the total
emissions in the year 2000 for the projected KPERMS participants, the
technical description of the KPERMS sources (EPA 2001), and the costs of
add-on control technologies available to these sources (Table 1), is provided
by the EPA (Chu 1998). The emission dataset covers 42 large ﬁrms which had
emission levels of more than 30 tons of NOx in 2000.
According to the EPA’s technical report (Chu 1998), Low NOx  Burner
(LNB) is regarded as the BACT for the electricity-generating, petrochemical,
papermaking, cement-manufacturing and fertiliser-producing industries.
Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR), on the other hand, is the most cost-effective
equipment for the steel-rolling, steel- and iron-casting and petroleum-reﬁning
industries. For the electricity-generating industry, LNB is often used with the
‘over-ﬁre air’ (OFA) process to increase the efﬁciency of pollution control.
Therefore, this study assumes that LNB, OFA and SCR are the only forms of
add-on
3 equipment that will be used by ﬁrms. Although the potential cost-saving
3 ‘Add-on’ systems refer to equipment installed downstream of an air pollution source to
control its emissions.
Table 1 Best available control technology and its average cost function for NOx reduction
Technology Industry Control 
efﬁciency
(%)
Average cost function for emission 
reduction (#10 000 per ton)
LNB + OFA Electricity generation 50 y = 5.62 × 10
–11x 2 – 0.12 × 10
–5x + 6.69 × 10
–3
SCR Steel rolling  80 y = (4.88 × 10
–2) · x
−0.49
Steel and iron casting – –
Petroleum reﬁning – –




LNB, low NOx burner; OFA, over ﬁre air; SCR, selective catalytic reduction.
Notes: y represents the average abatement costs of reducing x tons of NOx emissions. Multiplying both
sides of the equations by x yields the total cost functions used in the economic model.
ZFY
f
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from permit trading arises due to the heterogeneity of pollution control tech-
nologies among ﬁrms, the survey in the technical report (Chu 1998) indicates
that more than 98 per cent of ﬁrms in this area had already adopted LNB,
OFA and SCR on some of the existing equipment following the imposition
of air pollution fees in the year 1995, combined with the fact that the government
had identiﬁed the NOx control equipment as BACT on several occasions
and in different publications (e.g. EPA 1996, 2003; Industrial Development
Bureau 2002). This gives us reason to believe that the equipment will still be
chosen by ﬁrms based on cost minimisation considerations. According to
the estimated cost functions for LNB, OFA and SCR shown in Table 1, the
average abatement costs will tend to decline as more emissions are reduced.
That is, ﬁrms will face increasing returns to scale (IRTS) with regard to emis-
sion controls.
The unit air pollution fee paid by each ﬁrm in 2004 in the model is based
on a mail survey. This is because the information is conﬁdential for both the
EPA and the ﬁrms. To increase their willingness to disclose these numbers,
ﬁrms were only asked to write the average of what they paid in 2004.
4 The
average unit air pollution fee obtained from the survey turned out to be
#148.7 per ton, and this ranged between #77 and #310 per ton. However,
there was no way to test the accuracy of the data.
5. Results
By applying the collected data, this study simulates the ﬁrms’ emission reduction
strategies in KPERMS for ﬁve years under a 6 per cent discount rate through
the solver SBB, CPLEX and SNOPT offered in the General Algebraic Model-
ling  System (GAMS).
5 The reason for choosing a ﬁve-year duration is to
avoid the difﬁculty of modelling a more complicated case where the ERC
might have expired. In addition, the capability of the current software for
solving the MINLP problem also has its limitations. One thing that needs to
be kept in mind is that constraints (9) and (10) give rise to improper convexity
in the model. Even though the supplementary information from the solvers’
status based on the GAMS may indicate that the model works well, computational
problems may still occur when applying this model to other problems with
different cost structures, baseline emission levels, trading rules or even the
solvers used. In addition, since there is just one ﬁrm from each of the food,
papermaking, cement-manufacturing and fertiliser-producing industries, they
will be categorised under ‘other’ industries in the following discussion.
4 In Taiwan, ﬁrms need to report their emission levels four times a year. Within a year, they
may have different air pollution fee rates depending on factors such as a ﬁrm’s location or
whether or not a clean input such as gas is used for production.
5 SBB, CPLEX and SNOPT are solvers that can be used for MINLP, mixed integer program-
ming and non-linear programming problems. They were developed by M. Bussieck of GAMS
and A. Drud of AKRI Consulting and Development, ILOG and P. Gill University of San Diego,
along with W. Murray and M. Saunders at Stanford University.484 C.-N. Liao
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At the 0.8 reservation coefﬁcient, the simulation results (Table 2) reveal a
total regulatory cost of #9.87 million. Of this, #4.36 million is for air pollution
fees, and #5.51 million is for the NOx reduction. Firms in the petrochemical
and electricity-generating industries play a major role in supplying the ERCs
in the market, while most ﬁrms in the petroleum-reﬁning, steel-rolling and
other industries take on the role of buyers. If, instead of implementing the
proposed mixed system, the control agency decides to stick with the current
air pollution fee regulation and does not require any NOx reduction, the total
fee expended by ﬁrms will be #5.59 million during the ﬁve-year planning
horizon. Therefore, switching from the current pure fee regulation to the new
system will raise the total costs by 77 per cent.
In the ﬁrst year, it is found that 3741 units of ERCs were traded; however,
the amounts of the transactions went up to 4164, 6323, 6296 and 6342 from
year 2 to year 5, respectively. On the other hand, the amounts of the banking
from year 1 to year 5 were 7155, 3545, 1551, 203 and 0 tons, respectively.
Thus, even if the reservation coefﬁcient imposes a penalty on ﬁrms with NOx
reductions and banking, the IRTS property of pollution control will still
encourage some ﬁrms to reduce their emissions by more than the required
amount and to bank them for future use. However, zero banking in year 5
may be due to the setting of a ﬁve-year planning horizon. The social planner
under a trading program with a limited life might ask ﬁrms to only generate
an ‘exact’ amount of ERCs for cost minimisation purposes.
6 Although the
target NOx emission reduction level is initially 7262 tons (Table 2), the setting
of exchange and reservation coefﬁcients leads to an annual average reduction
level of 9056 tons. That is, NOx emissions are reduced by a further 8970 tons
during the ﬁve-year planning horizon. While an over-reduction in emissions
by ﬁrms might be beneﬁcial to the environment, since some of the banked
ERCs are withdrawn to offset the emissions, the actual NOx reduction in
some years (such as years 2 and 3 in Table  2) are seen to be below the
6 One exception is when the unit air pollution fee is set at high levels. Some ﬁrms might be
willing to reduce emissions more than the required amount and to let those banked ERCs
expire at the end of year 5 in order to reduce their air pollution fee expenditure.
Table 2 Simulation results with a 1.2 exchange coefﬁcient and 0.8 reservation coefﬁcient
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Emission level without regulation (tons) 72 618 72 618 72 618 72 618 72 618
Required reduction (tons)  7262  7262  7262  7262  7262
Actual total NOx reduction (tons) 16 596  5979  7032  7323  8352
Number of traded ERCs (tons)  3741  4164  6323  6296  6342
Total banked ERCs (tons)  7155  3545  1551   203   0
ERC price (#/tons) 28.2 35.2 44.0 55.0 68.8
Total air pollution fee after the 
regulation (# million)
4.36
Total regulatory costs (# million) 9.87Mixed system for nitrogen oxide control 485
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
required level. This also implies that we should expect worse air quality in
these years due to the way in which the bankings are designed.
The shadow price information that is discounted by 6 per cent in each year
from the equilibrium constraint in the GAMS indicates that the trading
prices from year 1 to year 5 are #28.2, #35.2, #44, #55 and #68.8 per ton,
respectively. However, these shadow prices may or may not be interpreted as
equilibrium prices due to the discontinuity of the model (Gomory and Bau-
mol 1960). To check whether or not these prices can accurately reﬂect the
imputed value of the scarce resource, such as tradable permits in this study,
another economic model based on ﬁrms’ cost minimising behaviour under a
perfectly competitive permit market is used. In this model, each ﬁrm tries to
minimise its own regulatory costs while acting as a permit price taker in the
market. The shadow prices derived from the social planner’s model are then
plugged into the model from the ﬁrms’ perspective to determine if their
behaviour conforms to that required by the social planner. The results of the
simulation indicate that the ﬁrms behave just as the social planner wanted
them to. Therefore, the shadow price reported by the GAMS solver can be
interpreted as the equilibrium price, at least in this case. To determine if these
prices are affected by discounting the banked ERC, the results of the sensitiv-
ity analysis conducted using different reservation coefﬁcients are reported in
Table 3. These results indicate that the permit price is relatively stable under
a zero reservation rate. When banking is discounted, the prices in general
would exhibit an increasing trend from years 1 to 4. If the coefﬁcient is set
under 0.7, the price will be over 100 in year 4 and will then drop by a large
amount in the last year. This is because some ﬁrms (from the petrochemical
industry), which originally acted as permit buyers, are now asked by the
social planner to reduce their emissions by only a smaller amount to meet a
more stringent banking rule, and incur relatively higher regulatory costs
under the IRTS characteristic. Thus, we can conclude that the permit prices
are very sensitive to the setting of the reservation coefﬁcient.
The results obtained from the sensitivity analysis in Table 3 also show that
a reservation rate that is close to 1 will tend to encourage more banking and
lower the total regulatory costs. However, it will give rise to a more uneven
emission reduction pattern and higher air quality uncertainty. On the other
hand, if we lower the reservation coefﬁcient from 1 to 0.5, the total regula-
tory costs will only be increased by 4 per cent from #9.7 to #10.1 million. At
the same time, the amount of banked ERCs will decrease by 35 per cent,
while the total amount of the reduction in NOx will increase by 14 per cent
due to the change. Larger emission reductions under lower reservation co-
efﬁcients will also imply better environmental quality and less air pollution
fee revenue. However, the results indicate that the fee revenue will only be
reduced by 2 per cent. In addition, less banking is accompanied by a more
evenly distributed emission control pattern during the ﬁve-year planning
horizon (Table 3). Therefore, the control agency should consider setting a
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ERC, emission reduction credit.
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Based on the current KPERMS draft, we have no information on the
preferential fee rate for ﬁrms in the program. Thus, we further simulate a case
where various preferential air pollution fee rates are applied to the ﬁrms when
the exchange and reservation coefﬁcients are set at 1.2 and 0.8, respectively.
The results (Table 4) show that even when all ﬁrms are exempted from any
pollution fee (100 per cent off), the difference in terms of the total reduction
in emissions in the case where ﬁrms pay the year 2004 fee rate is only 357
tons. This implies that the ﬁrms’ emission reduction behaviour is not affected
much by the preferential fee rate that we assumed in the study. In addition, it
has almost no impact on the amount of banked ERCs and their correspond-
ing trading volume in the market. However, the total pollution fee revenue
will decline sharply by #4.36 million if the mixed system is transferred to a
pure permit trading scheme. Therefore, if the control agency wishes to use the
fee rate as a tool to encourage a greater reduction in emissions, it should
consider differentiating the rate among ﬁrms regardless of whether it gets
involved in emission control activities.
Lastly, we simulate two other scenarios for comparison purposes (Table 5).
In Scenario 1 where both the exchange and reservation coefﬁcients are set to 1,
the results indicate that the total regulatory costs will decline to #6.21 million
and will be 37 per cent lower than in the case where the exchange and reservation
Table 4 Total air pollution fee under various preferential rates
Discount applied
















0% off 9.87 4.36 45 282 26 866 12 454
20% off 8.99 3.49 45 092 26 829 11 649
40% off 8.12 2.62 45 055 26 824 11 498
60% off 7.25 1.75 44 975 26 719 11 189
80% off 6.37 0.87 44 924 26 858 10 934
100% off 5.5 0 44 924 26 897 10 934
ERC, emission reduction credit.
Table 5 Simulation results based on a one-to-one trading ratio
Base case Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Exchange coefﬁcient 1.2 1 1
Reservation coefﬁcient 0.8 1 1
Air pollution fee rate Year 2004 fee rate Year 2004 fee rate 0
Total air pollution fee (# million) 4.36 4.5 0
Total regulatory costs (# million) 9.87 6.21 1.7
Total required NOx reduction (tons) 36 309 36 309 36 309
Actual total NOx reduction (tons) 45 282 36 309 36 309
Number of traded ERCs (tons) 26 866 32 689 32 689
Total banked ERCs (tons) 12 455 0 0
ERC, emission reduction credit.488 C.-N. Liao
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coefﬁcients are 1.2 and 0.8, respectively (the ﬁrst column in Table 5). In Scenario
2, not only is 1 used for both of these coefﬁcients, but a pure permit trading
scheme with no air pollution fee is also assumed. The total regulatory costs
in this case decrease only to #1.7 million. In addition, since no ﬁrm has any
desire to bank ERCs under either of these scenarios, this implies that a bal-
anced emission reduction pattern is expected. However, the air quality will
still ﬂuctuate if ERCs are bought by ﬁrms that cause more damage as a result
of their emissions. Since the total costs under this one-to-one trading ratio
are much lower, the control agency should consider giving up the possible
location effects at this moment in time if its major concern is to raise the
ﬁrms’ willingness to accept the new regulatory system.
6. Conclusion
Based on a social planner’s perspective of minimising the total regulatory
costs for NOx control, a MINLP model that mixes air pollution fees and
permit trading is developed to simulate a newly proposed regulatory scheme
in Taiwan. The results indicate that the ﬁrms’ total costs for NOx control will
be increased by 77 per cent if the regulation is switched from the current air
pollution fee to the proposed mixed system, with the exchange and reservation
rates being set at 1.2 and 0.8, respectively. Firms in the petrochemical and
electricity-generating industries are the major ERC suppliers in the market,
while ﬁrms in the other industries are the buyers. Although the annual
required reduction level is only around 7262 tons, the exchange coefﬁcient
used in ERC trading leads to an average reduction level of 9056 tons within
a 5 year planning period. However, if ﬁrms are allowed to carry more ERCs
for future use, the IRTS characteristic of pollution control leads to uneven
reduction activities in each year. The situation becomes even more severe
when the reservation coefﬁcient is set close to 1. Based on our simulation, a
lower reservation coefﬁcient would encourage more emission reduction and
lead to a smooth reduction pattern without the government losing too much
pollution fee revenue. In addition, the ﬁrms’ total regulatory costs would
only be raised by a relatively small amount under these circumstances. Due to
the fact that the environmental quality could be further improved by an over-
reduction in NOx emissions, a lower reservation rate could be set to maintain a
more stable air quality.
Compared with the air pollution fee rate, the reservation coefﬁcient used
in banking plays a more important role in determining the ﬁrms’ emission
reduction level. Based on the current setting, a change in the fee rate will
affect the tax revenue, but will have virtually no impact on the amount of the
pollution reduction. Since ﬁrms in the petrochemical and electricity-generating
industries maintain almost the same emission reduction levels under various
air pollution fee rates, the lower fee rates will only beneﬁt those ﬁrms that are
not committed to any form of pollution control. Therefore, if the objective of the
control agency is to obtain a greater reduction in emissions or to encourageMixed system for nitrogen oxide control 489
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ﬁrms to use a more efﬁcient control technology, it should then try to use a
more differentiated fee rate schedule to encourage the ﬁrms to reduce their
emissions. For example, lower fee rates can be applied to ﬁrms with higher
emission reduction levels. Although banking may offer a certain degree of
ﬂexibility in regard to controlling emissions, the results of the simulation
indicate that this will lead to unstable air quality in our mixed system when
a reservation coefﬁcient close to 1 is applied to the unused ERCs at the same
time as a-non-one-to-one trading base. On the other hand, setting both the
exchange and reservation coefﬁcients to 1 can effectively eliminate the ﬁrms’
desire to resort to banking even under the assumption of IRTS for emission
control (Scenarios 1 and 2). However, the ﬁnding of zero banking may be due
to the ﬁrms’ ability to generate ERCs in our dataset. If some large polluting
ﬁrms can reduce their emissions to zero at one time and supply enough per-
mits through banking for several trading seasons, we should still expect some
banking under the IRTS property. Therefore, how environmental quality or
ﬁrms’ emission reduction strategies might be affected by banking permits will
depend on the interaction of several factors such as trading rules, the cost
structure of emission controls, the ﬁrms’ baseline emission levels, or whether
or not an air pollution fee is also used.
Apart from the policy implications derived from the simulation, this study
contributes to the existing permit trading literature by proposing an opera-
tional framework that can deal simultaneously with both the exchange rate
and the banking of permits. By weighting all the intended goals such as
maintaining the current air pollution fee, encouraging greater emission
reductions, or achieving a more stable air quality, the control agency can easily
ﬁnd an appropriate combination of the parameters in the model by analysing
ﬁrms’ reactions to the policy changes.
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